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Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron
Thomas J. Milest & Cass R. Sunsteintt
In the past quarter century, the Supreme Court has legitimated agency authority to interpret
regulatorylegislation,above all in Chevron U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
the most cited case in modern public law. Chevron recognizes that the resolution of statutory ambiguities often requires judgments of policy; its callfor judicial deference to reasonableinterpretations was widely expected to have eliminated the role of policy judgments in judicial review of
agency interpretationsof law. But this expectation has not been realized. On the Supreme Court,
conservative justices vote to validate agency decisions less often than liberal justices.Moreover, the
most conservative members of the Supreme Court show significantly increased validation of
agency interpretationsafter PresidentBush succeeded President Clinton,and the least conservative
members of the Court show significantly decreased validation rates in the same period. In a similar
vein, the most conservative members of the Court are less likely to validate liberal agency interpretations than conservative ones, and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite
pattern.
Similar patternscan be found on federal appellate courtm In lower court decisions involving
the EPA and the NLRB from 1990 to 2004, Republican appointees demonstrated a greater willingness to invalidate liberal agency decisions and those of Democratic administrations These
differences are greatly amplified when Republican appointees sit with two Republican appointees
and when Democraticappointeessit with two Democraticappointee&
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I. INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Chevron
US.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,' one of the most

important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law.'
Chevron famously established a two-step inquiry for courts to follow
in reviewing agency interpretations of law. The first step asks "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," an in-

quiry that requires an assessment of whether Congress's intent "is
clear" and "unambiguously expressed."' The second step asks whether
the agency's interpretation is "permissible," which is to say reasonable
in light of the underlying law.'

This two-step approach appears to call for a large degree of judicial deference to agency interpretations, and indeed an early study
found that the Chevron decision significantly increased the rate of
judicial deference. For its defenders, Chevron signaled a healthy
awareness that the resolution of ambiguities calls for judgments of
policy-and an accompanying belief that such judgments should be
made by political actors, not by the federal judiciary An additional
advantage of the Chevron approach is its potential to reduce variation
within federal courts of appeals through its simple instruction that
courts should uphold all reasonable interpretations of ambiguous

terms. In light of that instruction, different courts of appeals should
usually reach the same result, permitting agency interpretations so
long as they are reasonable. And indeed, the leading treatise on the
topic offers this bold assessment: "Chevron has reduced significantly the

problem of inconsistent interpretations of agency-administered national
467 US 837 (1984).
As a sign of Chevron's influence, consider the fact that the decision was cited 2,414 times
in its first decade (between 1984 and January 1, 1994), 2,584 times in its next six years (between
January 1, 1994, and January 1, 2000), and 2,235 times in its next five years (between January 1,
2000, and January 28,2005). LEXIS search, Mar 2006.
3
See 467 US at 842-44.
4
Id at 842-43.
5
Id at 843-44.
6
See Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:An EmpiricalStudy
of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984, 1057-59 (noting that circuit courts affirmed
agency decisions at a higher rate after Chevron was decided than before).
7
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.2-3.4 at 141-48 (Aspen 4th
ed 2002) ("The Chevron Court did criticize, however, and held unlawful, substitution of judicial
policy preferences for agency policy preferences where Congress intended to delegate policymaking to an agency.").
1
2

8
See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093,

1121-22 (1987) (arguing that "the Chevron rule subdues this diversity [of interpretation of ambiguous statutes by the various circuits], and thus enhances the probability of uniform national
administration of the laws").
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statutes. Its effect is to preclude judges from second-guessing agency
policy decisions by mischaracterizing those decisions as resolutions of
questions of law."9
The purpose of this Article is to explore the role of judicial convictions in the application of Chevron. Two data sets are analyzed. The
first consists of all Supreme Court decisions between 1989 and 2005
that reviewed agency interpretations of law.'" This data set consists of
eighty-four decisions, and we focus on sixty-nine in which the Court
applied the Chevron framework. In the remaining fifteen decisions,
the Court reviewed an agency decision but did not expressly apply
Chevron. In many of these instances, a concurring or dissenting justice
expressed the belief that the Court should have applied Chevron. Although the number of such decisions is too small to permit a formal
analysis of the differences between Chevron and what we call "nonChevron" decisions, these cases offer hints as to the Court's willingness to apply Chevron and whether Chevron makes a difference
within the Court.
The second data set includes decisions from the circuit courts of
appeals, and it contains a substantially larger number of opinions, 253.
It consists of all published cases from 1990 through 2004 in which federal judges reviewed interpretations of law by the EPA and the
NLRB. Of the 253 opinions, 183 involved the EPA, and 70 involved
the NLRB. Federal circuit judges cast 758 votes in these cases. As in
the Supreme Court opinions, the circuit courts typically resolved these
cases by applying Chevron; in only 26 cases did they not apply it. The
use of two data sets affords the opportunity to evaluate whether the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts differ in their application of
Chevron.
The simplest finding is that on both the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals, the application of the Chevron framework is greatly
affected by the judges' own convictions. Whatever Chevron may say,
the data reveal a strong relationship between the justices' ideological
9 Pierce, 1 Administrative Law § 3.4 at 148 (cited in note 7).
10 These cases were found by placing Chevron in the relevant databases. Hence we do not
include any decisions that review agency interpretations of law without reference to Chevron, a
category that might include decisions in which the Chevron framework was deemed inapplicable,
and so deemed without discussion. Because Chevron is standardly cited in judicial review of
agency interpretations of law, even in cases in which its framework does not apply, our method is
unlikely to produce distortions even if the resulting data set is incomplete.
A note on research method: we began by asking research assistants to compile and code the
cases in order to investigate our various hypotheses. After they produced their initial results, we
recompiled and recoded the cases ourselves. Our own coding produced some differences in the
numbers, but the central patterns were the same. See note 32 (discussing our decision to drop the
data involving the Federal Communications Commission). The data can be obtained from the
authors on request.
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predispositions and the probability that they will validate agency determinations. The most conservative justices are 30 percentage points
more likely to vote to validate agency interpretations that are coded
as conservative than to validate agency interpretations coded as liberal. By contrast, the more liberal justices are 27 percentage points
more likely to vote to validate agency interpretations coded as liberal
than to validate those coded as conservative. Moreover, the most conservative justices on the Supreme Court show a validation rate 19 percentage points lower when applying the Chevron framework to the
interpretations of the Clinton administration than to those of the two
Bush administrations -while the more liberal justices show a validation rate 6 percentage points higher under the Clinton administration
than under the two Bush administrations. If judicial decisions under
the Chevron framework are assessed in crudely political terms, the
voting patterns of Supreme Court justices fit with the conventional
groupings of the justices along political lines-a clear signal that the
Chevron framework is not having the disciplining effect that it is supposed to have.
Consider also a remarkable fact: Justice Breyer, the Court's most
vocal critic of a strong reading of Chevron," is the most deferential
justice in practice, while Justice Scalia, the Court's most vocal Chevron
enthusiast,'2 is the least deferential. Overall, the data show that the
justices' validation rates are consistent with common perceptions of
their political ideology. More liberal justices vote to validate at higher
rates than more conservative justices. Moreover, it is unclear whether
Chevron has any effect within the Court. Although the number of
cases in which the Court did not apply Chevron is small and nonrandom, ideological disagreements in cases applying Chevron are as large
as in cases not applying its two-step analysis. A casual comparison of
Chevron and non-Chevron cases does not suggest that Chevron suc-

ceeds in dampening the influence of ideology in the Court's review of
agency interpretations.
Within the courts of appeals, the patterns also reveal a strong influence of political convictions in judicial review of agency interpretations of law. When the agency decision is liberal, the average Democratic appointee to the appellate courts is about 14 percentage points
11 See Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev
363, 372-82 (1986) (characterizing the strong reading of Chevron as "seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless"); see also Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting
Our Democratic Constitution 106-08, 130 (Knopf 2005) ("Deference to a reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision often makes sense, but not always.").
12 See generally Antonin Scalia,JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
Duke L J 511 (defending the Chevron rule on the grounds that it gives effect to congressional intent).
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more likely to vote to validate the agency than the average Republican appointee. But when the agency decision is conservative, this pattern flips, and the average Democratic appointee is 19 percentage
points less likely to vote to validate the agency decision than the average Republican appointee. This sharp reversal in validation rates indicates that, despite Chevron, industry groups are more likely to find a
sympathetic reaction from Republican appointees than from Democratic appointees. Similarly, public interest groups do better with Democratic appointees, even under the Chevron framework. Overall, Democratic appointees are 17 percentage points more likely to vote in a
stereotypically liberal fashion in Chevron cases than are Republican
appointees.
These differences become even more stark when the composition
of the appellate panels is considered. Perhaps most disturbingly, a Democratic appointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, is 31.5
percentage points more likely to vote to uphold a liberal decision than
a conservative one -and a Republican appointee, sitting with two Republican appointees, is over 40 percentage points more likely to vote
to uphold a conservative decision than a liberal one. We do not place
too much emphasis on the precise magnitudes of these differences,
because the number of observations in the finer decompositions of the
data is small. However, the role of political judgments in judicial review of agency interpretations of law, at both levels of appellate review, is unmistakable.
What are the implications of these findings? A full discussion would
be beyond the scope of the present Article; our emphasis is on the data,
not on what lessons to draw from it. But it is reasonable to suggest
that the meaning of federal statutory law should not be based on
whether a litigant has drawn a panel of judges appointed by a president from a particular party-or on whether the Supreme Court is
dominated by judges of any particular ideological stripe. If this suggestion is accepted, a strong endorsement of the agency's law-interpreting
power is the best way to achieve that goal. Whether or not that judgment is ultimately accepted, it is clear that as the law now stands, the
application of the Chevron framework, and hence the meaning of federal regulatory law, shows a significant effect from the political convictions of federal judges.
II. CHEVRON AND THE SUPREME COURT
A.

Simple Predictions about the Influence of Chevron

If the goal is to predict how Chevron might operate in practice, it
is sensible to begin with some hypotheses. Of these, the first and simplest is that Chevron would tend to eliminate systematic differences
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among judges along political lines. On this view, the consequence of
the two-step analysis should be to produce relatively uniform validation rates that do not correlate with the ideology of particular judges.
We might call this the doctrinal hypothesis, based as it is on the view
that existing doctrine, as reflected in Chevron, has successfully eliminated ideological differences within the judiciary.
A second hypothesis is that whatever Chevron says, political convictions actually continue to drive judicial review of agency interpretations of law. On this view, judges' political preferences influence and
perhaps even determine how they decide cases. In the context of reviewing agency interpretations, this hypothesis suggests that judges
are more likely to validate when the agency's conclusion conforms
with their policy judgments, regardless of whether the statutory text is
clear or ambiguous. Call this the realisthypothesis.
A third hypothesis emphasizes that the prevailing approach to
statutory interpretation should influence application of the two-step
analysis. In recent decades, a prominent approach has relied on the
"plain meaning" as reflected in the statutory text." As Justice Scalia
signaled long ago, those who believe that statutes have clear meanings
will be more likely to invalidate agency action at Chevron Step One."
Adherents to this approach should be less likely to validate the agency's
interpretation. By contrast, Justice Breyer rejects "plain meaning" approaches," and he and others who eschew "plain meaning" might well
be more likely to find textual ambiguity where Justice Scalia finds
clarity. Those who do not find a "plain meaning" should be more likely
to reach Chevron Step Two1 6 and ultimately to uphold reasonable
agency interpretations of law.
Of course there is no logical or necessary connection between
adoption of "plain meaning" approaches and being "liberal" or "conservative." But as an empirical matter, the more conservative justices
(Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) have embraced "plain
13 See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:FederalCourts and the Law
18-25 (Princeton 1997).
14 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 521 (cited in note 12) ("One who finds more often (as I do)
that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.").
15 See Breyer, Active Liberty at 85-101 (cited in note 11) (arguing that "overemphasis on
text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from life," and advocating "a purposive approach" to

statutory interpretation).
16 It is possible, of course, that those who reject "plain meaning" will turn out to take a
stronger, rather than weaker, stand against agency interpretations of law because they will emphasize legislative history and statutory purpose, both of which could, in principle, overcome
agency interpretations under Chevron Step One. To describe a testable hypothesis, however, we
are speculating that textualist judges will be more likely to invalidate agency decisions under that

step.
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meaning" approaches and the more liberal justices have not. We might
therefore hypothesize that the more textualist members of the Court,
who also are more conservative, will be more willing to invalidate
agency action on textual grounds under Step One. The less textualist
members of the Court, who are more likely to find ambiguity, will be
more inclined to affirm the agency action on reasonableness grounds.
Call this the formalist hypothesis.

It is worth noting that the realist hypothesis on the one hand and
the doctrinal and formalist hypotheses on the other have much in
common with the two canonical models of judicial behavior in political
science: the "attitudinal model" and the "legal model." The political science models seek to explain judicial behavior generally rather than in
the specific context of review of agency action. In the "attitudinal
model," a judge seeks to match a case's outcome to her own policy
preferences, and she is largely able to do so." In the "legal model," by
contrast, judges render decisions without reference to their own policy
preferences, relying instead on the facts of the case, stare decisis, and
relevant statutory provisions."8 A central difference between the "legal
model" of political science and the doctrinal and formalist hypotheses
we describe is that the latter identify Chevron and "plain meaning" as
the operative mechanisms, rather than relying, as the "legal model" does,
on generic notions of law.
A natural test of the doctrinal, realist, and formalist hypotheses
would be to correlate the validation rates of judges in Chevron cases
with the political leanings or interpretive approach of the judges. 9The
immediate difficulty with this test is that judges who favor "plain
meaning" are also politically conservative. Thus, the observation that
"plain meaning" judges validate at lower rates would be equivalent to
the observation that politically conservative judges validate at lower
rates. Would the lower validation rates of these judges be attributable
to their predilections or their approach?
To answer this question, and to test the competing hypotheses, we
examine variations in the political or ideological content of the agency
decisions. According to the doctrinal hypothesis, the probability that a
judge votes to validate the agency should bear little relationship to the

17 The literature on the attitudinal model is large. For an example, see Saul Brenner and
Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992
59-71 (Cambridge 1995).
18 See, for example, id at 72-88 (discussing and testing the legal model in stare decisis cases).
19 There is a fourth hypothesis, which we might call the bureaucratic hypothesis, to the
effect that some justices would be more inclined to uphold agency decisions than others, whatever the ideological content of those decisions. We shall say a few words about this hypothesis
below. We bracket it here to avoid undue complexity.
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ideological content of the agency decision. The same is true of the
formalist hypothesis. The essential test of "plain meaning" -whether a
statute's meaning is clear or ambiguous-should be independent of the
ideological content of the agency interpretation.
The realist hypothesis offers a different prediction. In this view,
judges invalidate when the agency decision conflicts with their political inclinations and validate when it conforms to those inclinations.
Specifically, the realist hypothesis predicts, as the formalist alternative
does not, that validation rates should correlate positively with the political content of agency decisions.
To test these predictions, we employ two proxies for the ideological content of the agency decisions -proxies that also seem to us of
independent interest. The first proxy is simply whether the case was
decided during a Democratic or Republican administration. For purposes of evaluating the ideological content of a judicial decision, it
surely matters, as a general rule, whether the court is reviewing a decision under President Clinton or instead President George W. Bush. A
natural objection to this measure is that litigation challenging agency
decisions often consumes years. If the litigation spans two administrations, this proxy may incorrectly attribute an agency position to President Bush that was actually adopted under President Clinton. But this
objection should not be overstated. For purposes of assessing the various hypotheses, it is important to identify the administration that is
actually defending the regulation that is being challenged. Moreover,
the concern about this measure is mitigated by the ability of a new administration to change the agency position and to settle litigation any
time before the court renders its decision.) Note also that we calculated a two year "lag" on presidential years, to take account of the possibility that presidents would be defending regulations of their predecessors. Under this variation, we obtained our same basic results.'
The second measure codes an agency decision as "liberal," simply
and crudely, by reference to the identity of the party challenging it. If
an industry group or corporation challenges an agency decision, we
code the decision as "liberal," not in the abstract, but for the purpose
of assessing the legal issue involved in the case. We use this coding
technique on the theory that if an industry is challenging a decision by
the EPA, or if a company is challenging a decision by the NLRB, the
agency's decision is likely to be perceived as liberal in the context of
judicial review. If a public interest group or labor union challenges an
20
Another caveat is that the relatively short time period studied, 1989-2005, encompasses
only one Democratic administration, the Clinton administration. However, for clarity we generally refer to the presidencies as Democratic or Republican.
21
Data available from the authors.
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agency decision, we code the decision as conservative, at least for that
purpose. The advantage of this method of coding decisions is its mechanical and objective character. The disadvantage is its crudeness. In
a small number of instances, we deviated from the coding rule when it
produced an obvious error.2
B.

Supreme Court Review in Chevron Cases
1. Basic data.

Table 1 presents numbers that provide an initial assessment of the
three hypotheses for Supreme Court justices. It reports validation rates
in Chevron cases by justice, and it demonstrates that Chevron does not
come close to equalizing the validation rates of the justices. Hence, the
doctrinal hypothesis is inconsistent with the data. As both the formalist and realist accounts predict, the identity of the justice correlates
with the likelihood of validation of the agency decision.
Column (1) shows that the overall validation rates vary by as many
as 30 percentage points across the justices. Of the nine justices, Justices
Breyer and Souter have the highest validation rates, at 81.8 percent
and 77 percent, respectively. In contrast, Justices Thomas and Scalia, at
52.2 percent and 53.6 percent, respectively, have the lowest validation
rates in Chevron cases. Although the sample sizes are relatively small,
the difference in validation rates between Justices Scalia and Breyer is
statistically significant, as is the difference between Justices Scalia and
Souter. Similarly, Justice Thomas's validation rate is statistically different from those of Justices Breyer and Souter.
Note, however, that many of the differences are insignificant at
the statistical level. For example, the apparently large gap in validation
rates between Justice Rehnquist on the one hand and Justices Scalia
and Thomas on the other-more than 10 percentage points-is not
statistically significant. Taken as a whole, the evidence in column (1),
while repudiating the doctrinal hypothesis, is largely consistent with
both the realist and formalist hypotheses; conservative and "plain meaning" justices tend to validate the agency decision less often than justices
who are liberal or do not subscribe to the "plain meaning" approach.

For example, some public interest groups that challenged agency decisions, such as Focus
22
on the Family, were clearly not liberal, and cases had to be coded accordingly.
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TABLE 1

Validation Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices in
Chevron Cases: Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)

Justice
Stevens

Total
(1)
.710

Ideological Content
of Agency Decision
Not
Difference
Liberal
Liberal
of
(2)
(3)
(2)-(3):
.860
.462
.399**

Party of Current President
Difference
Democrat Repubican
of
(4)
(5)
(4)-(5):
.806
.632
.175

(.055)
[69]

(.053)
[43]

(.100)
[26]

(.103)

(.072)
[31]

(.079)
[38]

(.109)

Souter

.770
(.054)
[61]

.821
(.062)
[39]

.682
(.102)
[22]

.139
(.113)

.774
(.076)
[31]

.767
(.079)
[30]

.008
(.no)

Breyer

.818
(.059)
[441

.900
(.056)
[30]

.643
(.133)
[14]

.257**
(.129)

.833
(.078)
[24]

.800
(.092)
[20]

.033
(.119)

Ginsburg

.740
(.063)
[50]

0.818
(.068)
[33]

.588
(.123)
[17]

.230*
(.129)

.724
(.084)
[29]

.762
(.095)
[21]

-.038
(.128)

O'Connor

.677
(.058)
[65]

.625
(.078)
[40]

.760
(.087)
[25]

-.135
(.120)

.655
(.090)
[29]

.694
(.078)
[36]

-.039
(.118)

Kennedy

.672
(.058)
[67]

.667
(.074)
[42]

.680
(.095)
[25]

-.013
(.120)

.774
(.076)
[31]

.583
(.083)
[36]

.191*
(.U4)

Rehnquist

.638
(.058)
[69]

.558
(.077)
[43]

.769
(.084)
[26]

-.211*
(.118)

.516
(.091)
[31]

.737
(.072)
[38]

-.221*
(.115)

Scalia

.522
(.061)
[69]

.419
(.076)
[43]

.692
(.092)
[26]

-.273**
(.121)

.419
(.090)

.605
(.080)

-.186
(.121)

[31]

[38]

.536
(.067)
[561

.378
(.081)
[371

.842
(.086)
[19]

-.464**
(.129)

Thomas

.484

.600

-.116

(.091)

(.100)

(.143)

[31]

[25]

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Although the doctrinal hypothesis cannot stand, we can easily see
that the ordering of the justices by validation rates largely conforms
with the standard alignment of justices on the ideological spectrum.
The justices generally thought to be liberal-Justices Stevens, Souter,
Breyer, and Ginsburg-have validation rates in excess of 70 percent.
The justices generally thought to be conservative-Justices Scalia and
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Thomas-have validation rates under 55 percent. The validation rates
of justices generally thought to be swing voters-Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy-fall in the middle, at about 67 percent. The dominant
pattern of column (1) is that justices standardly characterized as liberal have the highest validation rates, while the justices standardly
characterized as conservative have the lowest validation rates. The
justice who is most difficult to classify is Chief Justice Rehnquist. The
level of his overall validation rate, at about 64 percent, suggests that
he should be grouped with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. However,
as the subsequent columns of Table 1 show, Rehnquist's validation
rate correlates strongly with the political content of agency action, and
this pattern makes his validation rate more akin to that of Justices
Scalia and Thomas rather than that of O'Connor and Kennedy. At the
same time, it is also striking that the highest validation rate comes from
the Court's strongest critic of Chevron (Justice Breyer),3 whereas the
lowest validation rate comes from the Court's strongest Chevron enthusiast (Justice Scalia)." In view of this finding alone, it would be reasonable to speculate that a judge's formal position on the deference principle matters much less than one might think.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 report the rates at which each justice validates a liberal agency decision (or, equivalently, rejects a challenge to an agency decision by an industry group). Columns (4) and
(5) present similar estimates when the rates are stratified by the party
of the current president. The Table also reports the differences between these measures for each justice. Notably, the validation rates of
some justices, such as Justice O'Connor, are nearly constant across
administrations, and others, such as Justice Kennedy, are unaffected by
whether the agency's decision was liberal. In contrast, the validation
rates of other justices fluctuate dramatically in accordance with politics. The validation rates of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg move
by more than 20 percentage points when the nature of the agency decision changes. Similarly, the rates of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas swing by more than 20 percentage points with a switch in the
political content of the agency decision.
In Table 1, the validation rates of the conservative justices appear
more sensitive to the presidential administration. However, as previously mentioned, our method of identifying administrations-the party
of the occupant of the White House at the time that the Court issues its
decision -is somewhat arbitrary. The fact that litigation takes a year or
See Breyer, Active Liberty at 106-08, 130 (cited in note 11); Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at
23
372-82 (cited in note 11).
See generally Scalia, 1989 Duke L J 511 (cited in note 12).
24
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more to reach the Court suggests an alternative specification of lagging the dates of a change in administration by a year or two. Although we do not report these specifications here to conserve space,
these alternative specifications show that the more liberal justices appear as sensitive to the party of the current administration as the more
conservative justices do. Although the magnitudes exhibit some sensitivity and the small number of observations make statistical significance difficult to attain, the role of politics is hard to miss.
The direction of these movements is largely consistent with conventional wisdom about each justice's ideological orientation. Justices
on the conservative wing of the court- Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-validate at higher rates during Republican administrations than
Democratic administrations. Justices on the liberal wing of the court such as Stevens and Ginsburg -validate at much higher rates when
the agency decision is liberal than when it is not. The validation rates
of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor, who typically are cast as
the moderate or "swing" justices, are less consistently correlated with
the ideological content of the agency decision.
2. Evaluating the hypotheses.
As is readily apparent from these figures, the formalist explanation does not square well with these results, and the realist explanation seems to fare much better. When the agency action is not liberal,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas show significant increases in validation rates. When the agency action is liberal,
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens show large increases in
validation rates. Justice Kennedy's validation rates show some sensitivity to the party of the current president, but not to the ideological
content of the agency decision. Justice O'Connor's validation rates
display the opposite pattern-some sensitivity to the political content
of the agency decision but not to the administration.
It is usual to sort the justices into three groups: the conservatives
(Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, or RST); the swing votes (O'Connor
and Kennedy, or OK); and the liberals (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, or SSGB). To obtain a better test of the competing hypothesis,
we aggregate the justices into these three widely acknowledged groups.
The data themselves provide some justification for these groupings. The
RST group features a validation rate of about 57 percent, the OK group
one of 67 percent, and the SSBG group one of 75 percent. The difference in rates between the SSBG group and the RST group is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Tables 2 and 3 report these fig-
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ures as well as validation rates by the ideological nature of the agency
respectively."
decision and by presidential administration,
TABLE 2
Validation Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in Chevron
Cases: Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Justice
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg

Total
(1)
.754
(.029)
[224]

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Not Liberal Difference
Liberal
of (2)-(3):
(3)
(2)
.266**
.582
.848
(.058)
(.056)
(.030)
[79]
[145]

O'Connor & Kennedy

.674
(.041)
[132]

.646
(.053)
[82]

.720
(.064)
[50]

-.074
(.084)

Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas

.567
(.036)
[194]

.455
(.045)
[123]

.761
(.051)
[71]

-.305**
(.071)

Difference of SSBG-OK

.080*
(.049)

.202**
(.056)

-.138
(.087)

Difference of SSBG-RST

.187**

.393**

-.178**

(.045)

(.053)

(.076)

.107*

.191**

-.041

(.055)

(.070)

(.081)

Difference of OK-RST

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Tables 2 and 3 show more concisely what was already apparent in
Table 1: the validation rates of the SSBG and RST groups correlate
with the ideological content of agency decisions. Table 2 shows that the
validation rates of SSBG move by more than 25 percentage points, a
statistically significant difference, and those of the RST group move by
more than 30 percentage points. Table 3 reports that when the party of
the current president is used as the measure of the political content of the
agency interpretation, these differences are about 6 percentage points for
the SSBG group and 18 percentage points for the RST group. Both of
these movements are in the expected direction.

25 Appendix Tables L.A through 1.1 report further details on the validation rates of the
individual justices
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3

Validation Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in
Chevron Cases: Total and by Party of Current President
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Justice
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg

Total
(1)
.754
(.029)
[2241

Party of Current President
Democratic Republican Difference
(2)
(3)
of (2)-(3):
.783
.725
.058
(.038)
(.043)
(.058)
[115]
[109]

O'Connor & Kennedy

.674
(.041)
[132]

.717
(.059)
[60]

.639
(.057)
[72]

.078
(.082)

Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas

.567
(.036)
[194]

.473
(.052)
[93]

.653
(.048)
[101]

-.180"*
(.070)

Difference of SSBG-OK

.080
(.049)

.066
(.068)

.086
(.070)

Difference of SSBG-RST

.187**
(.049)

.309**
(.064)

.071
(.064)

.107*

.243**

-.015

(.055)

(.080)

(.074)

Difference of OK-RST

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

These movements also show that it is not easy to conclude that
one wing of the Court is more responsive to the politics of a case than
the other wing. In Table 2, when the cases are stratified according to
whether the agency decision was liberal, the fluctuations in the validation rates of the RST and SSBG groups are similar in magnitudes; but
in Table 3, when the cases are grouped by party of the current president, the RST group exhibits a larger movement. Moreover, the magnitudes of these differences -30.5 versus 26.6 percentage points, and
18 versus 5.8 percentage points-are not so large as to make these
differences statistically different from each other.
At the same time, Tables 2 and 3 consistently show that liberal
judges validate at higher rates when the agency decision is liberal rather
than conservative, and the reverse is true for conservative justices. By
comparison, in both Table 2 and 3, the validation rate of the OK group
shows only modest movements. For each measure, the difference in
the validation rates of the OK group is less than 10 percentage points,
and neither is statistically significant.
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3. Qualified realism.
The figures in these initial tables provide some support for the
realist explanation, but they are not an unqualified confirmation of it.
A strong version of the realist view would predict that conservative
justices should exhibit high validation rates under Bush and low rates
under Clinton-and the converse should be true for liberal justices.
Committed realists might also be inclined to predict symmetry between conservative and liberal justices. When conservative justices review agency decisions that match their policy preferences, they should
validate at rates just as high as the validation rates of liberal justices
when the latter encounter agency decisions that match their policy
preferences. Similarly, the validation rates of conservative justices
should be just as low as those of liberal justices when they face agency
interpretations contrary to their political leanings. In effect, the validation rates of conservative and liberal justices should simply switch levels
depending on whether the agency interpretation matches their policy
preferences.
The tables do not consistently establish this simple pattern, but
Table 2 provides the strongest support for it. The likelihood that the
SSBG group validates an agency decision is more than 25 percentage
points higher when that decision is liberal, and the opposite is true for
the RST group. The validation rate of the OK group shows little movement depending on the ideological content of the agency decision. To
put it differently, the validation rates of the three groups of justices in
Table 2 rank according to whether the political content of the agency
decision is closest to the justices' ideological preferences.
The estimates in Table 3, however, do not lend themselves as easily to a realist interpretation. Those figures show that the validation
rates of the SSBG group are less responsive to the current administration and are everywhere higher than the validation rate of the RST
group. As described above, the estimates by administration are sensitive to how we define presidential administrations, but if taken at face
value, the estimates in Table 3 are not wholly consistent with the simplest version of realism. Thus, the strong version of the realist hypothesis-that liberal and conservative justices will have validation
rates that are mirror images of each other-does not find support in
Table 3.
The absence of a symmetrical pattern of seesawing validation
rates in Table 3 suggests that the realist model requires enrichment, or
the formalist model retains some relevance, or both. The first possibility is that the formalist account might have some continuing vitality.
Although the validation rates of the RST group fluctuate with the
administration- in contradiction of the simple version of the formalist
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model-their validation rates in Table 3 never exceed those of the
SSBG group. This finding seems to support the formalist account, because it is consistent with the hypothesis that the followers of the "plain
meaning" approach are more likely to conclude a text is unambiguous
and to forgo validation of the agency."
The second possibility is that a more fully articulated realist model
might also be consistent with these results. Liberal judges are generally
thought to be more deferential to administrative expertise and regulatory judgment-a theme that runs throughout Justice Breyer's writing." This view reflects a faith in the expertise and political accountability of agencies, and this faith is likely to motivate judges to validate
agencies, even when they render decisions at odds with a justice's own
policy preference. Call this the bureaucratichypothesis, one that would
predict a higher rate of validation by the liberal justices simply because they are more receptive to the exercise of discretion by regulatory institutions, regardless of their ideological valence.
The data do not permit us to distinguish clearly the role of "plain
meaning" approaches, variations in trust in bureaucracies, and pure
political preferences. Indeed, it is difficult to envision data that would
permit precise measurement of these influences. However, the data
offer some support for each explanation. First and perhaps most important, the realist model receives clear support from the finding that
probabilities of validation on the opposing wings of the Court correlate with whether the agency decision is liberal. Second, the "plain
meaning" methodology reduces the likelihood that its followers at any
time will vote to validate. The prediction of this account is that subscription to the "plain meaning" approach will bias downward the validation rates of its followers. Consistent with this prediction, the RST
group has an overall rate of validation lower than those of the other
justices.2 Third, belief in bureaucratic competence should increase the
26
To explore further the importance of the "plain meaning" approach, we examined the
decisions in which the Court under Chevron invalidated the agency interpretation and asked
whether particular groups of justices were more likely to invalidate under Step One or Step Two.
We found no substantial differences between the groups of justices in their likelihood of employing Step One or Step Two to invalidate. More than 90 percent of invalidations under Chevron
occurred under Step One.
27
See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle:Toward Effective Risk Regulation 61-63
(Harvard 1993) (discussing the bureaucratic virtues of rationalization, expertise, insulation, and
authority).
28
We recognize that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not subscribe to the "plain meaning"
approach nearly as clearly as Justices Scalia and Thomas do. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's overall
deference rate-64 percent-is well above that of Justices Scalia and Thomas-54 percent. However, when Justice Rehnquist's deference rate is compared to those of all eight other justices, we
believe that it is reasonable for purposes of this analysis to group him with Justices Scalia and

Thomas.
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likelihood that justices will vote to validate the agency at all times.
Consistent with this prediction, the SSBG group has an overall rate of
validation as least at high as those of the other justices.
4. An objection.
A possible objection to these findings is that they fail to control
for other factors influencing the justices' conclusions. For example,
one hypothesis could be that the willingness of justices to validate an
agency may have changed with the passage of time since Chevron, perhaps because the justices have grown accustomed to exercising deference or to applying the Chevron steps. Similarly, an examination of
aggregate validation rates does not control for the characteristics of
the cases, such as which agency is involved, the quality of the lawyers'
advocacy, the degree to which the particular challengers are sympathetic, the willingness of parties to appeal agency decisions, and other
differences. If such differences vary systematically with the likelihood
that the justices vote to validate, and especially if they correlate with
the political content of the cases, the estimates may be biased. A failure to control for such differences could therefore lead to improper
inferences about the role of politics in Chevron analysis.
To explore the robustness of the estimates to other potential influences on the likelihood that a justice validates, we conducted a regression analysis. Although the regressions did not permit us to account for selection effects, they allowed us to employ crude controls
for some possibly confounding factors. Two sets of controls or additional explanatory variables were included in the regressions. First,
indicator variables for each year, or so-called year fixed effects, controlled for any trends over time in the probability that a justice votes
to validate. Second, indicator variables for each case held constant any
variation across cases in the likelihood that a justice validates. The
resulting estimates were remarkably similar to the summary statistics.
When the agency decision is liberal or the president is a Democrat, the
SSBG and RST groups have validation rates that are significantly
higher and lower, respectively, than the OK group. But when the agency
decision is not liberal or the president is a Republican, the validation
rates of the three groups of justices are indistinguishable. As the regression analysis adds little to our analysis thus far, we do not report
the regression results separately here.29
The analysis here has been somewhat complex, and it will be useful to emphasize some of our principal findings by way of conclusion.
A more detailed description of the functional forms and specifications employed, as well
29
as the regression estimates themselves, are available from the authors upon request.
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When the agency decision is liberal, the RST group validates at a lower
rate, and the opposite is true for the SSBG group. The results support
the realist hypothesis. The validation rate of the RST group appears
sensitive to the political content of the agency decision and to the
party of the current president. When stratified by presidential administration, the validation rate of the SSBG group is always higher than
that of the RST group. This result poses a challenge for a strong version
of the realist account. These results are readily apparent in sample means
and are robust to regression specifications that explain more of the
variation in the probability of validation.
C. Liberal and Conservative Voting
Our analysis has coded cases in terms of the ideological valence
of the agency's decisions, which enables us to test the three hypotheses
with which we began. But it is also possible to produce an aggregated
data set, simply by coding judicial voting in liberal or conservative
terms. By this measure, we counted a judicial vote as liberal if it favors
upholding an agency interpretation against industry challenge or if it
favors invalidating an agency interpretation against the challenge of a
public interest group (or labor union). With this aggregate measure,
we obtain additional support for the qualified realist hypothesis.
Table 4 presents the rates of liberal voting for the three groups of
justices. Consistent with standard perceptions of the justices, the
SSBG group casts liberal votes at higher rates, and the RST group at
lower rates. The liberal voting rate of the OK group falls between
them. The most striking finding is a 30 percentage point overall difference in liberal votes between the SSBG and RST groups. This difference is statistically significant-as is the 16 percentage point difference between SSBG and OK. Indeed, the differences between the
SSBG group and the RST and OK groups are at least 15 percentage
points and are statistically significant in both Democratic and Republican administrations. In addition to according with common perceptions of the justices, these results provide direct support for the realist
hypothesis.
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4

Liberal Voting Rates of Groups of Supreme Court Justices in
Chevron Cases: Total and by Party of Current President
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Justice
Stevens, Souter, Breyer & Ginsburg

Total
(1)
.670
(.031)
[224]

Party of Current President
Democratic Republican Difference
(2)
(3)
of (2)-(3):
.730
.606
.125**
(.042)
(.047)
(.063)
[115]
[109]

O'Connor & Kennedy

.508
(.044)
[132]

.567
(.065)
[601

.458
(.059)
[72]

.108
(.088)

Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas

.366
(.035)
[194]

.387
(.051)
[93]

.347
(.048)
[1011

.041
(.070)

Difference of SSBG-OK

.162**

.164"*

.147**

(.053)

(.074)

(.075)

Difference of SSBG-RST

.304**
(.047)

.343**
(.065)

.259**
(.067)

Difference of OK-RST

.142**

.180**

.112

(.055)

(.082)

(.075)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

At the same time, there are noteworthy differences across administrations. All three groups of justices show somewhat higher liberal voting rates in Democratic administrations. The increase in liberal
votes in Democratic administrations is consistent with the view that
Chevron actually has an effect. If Chevron succeeds in restraining the
political preferences of the justices, liberals should have lower liberal
voting rates when the president is Republican because Chevron should
cause liberals to validate some conservative agency decisions. Similarly, it should cause conservatives to have higher liberal voting rates
when the president is Democratic because it requires conservatives to
validate some liberal agency decisions. For both liberal and conservative justices, liberal voting rates should be higher during Democratic
presidencies and lower in Republican ones. Table 4 offers some qualified support for this prediction. For the SSBG and OK groups, the rate
of liberal voting rises by more than 10 percentage points when a Democrat is president. In contrast, the increase for the RST group is only
4 percentage points. These results provide partial support for both the
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doctrinal and realist hypotheses, though the realist view seems to do
somewhat better.
D. Chevron and Non-Chevron Review in the Supreme Court
The analysis thus far shows that even with the constraint of Chevron's two-step framework, politics continues to play a role in the judicial review of agency decisions. This influence of politics is, however,
only a partial answer to the larger question of how Chevron affects judicial review of agency interpretations. An answer to this broader
question requires an assessment of whether, in the absence of Chevron, politics would exert a stronger influence in judicial review. Nothing that we have said thus far precludes the possibility that Chevron
has had some equalizing influence. In other words, the significance of
the findings thus far is difficult to assess because they do not provide a
baseline of what judicial review would occur in the absence of Chevron.
The ideal baseline for evaluating this broader significance is the
counterfactual of judicial review without Chevron. We could imagine a
thought experiment in which courts would divide review of agency
decisions into two groups. In one group, the court would be required
to apply Chevron, and in the other, it would be required not to do so.
The difference in the validation rates between these two groups of
cases would provide a measure of Chevron's impact on judicial review.
Of course, we cannot conduct this ideal experiment. The analysis to
follow is somewhat complex; the largest lesson is that we find no evidence that Chevron is influencing ideological voting on the Court.
The justices themselves decide whether and when to apply Chevron. In the jargon of statistics, the application of Chevron is not exogenous. Rather, its application is, to some degree, an interpretive
choice of the Court itself. The doctrinal and the realist hypotheses disagree about the extent to which the justices have discretion to exercise
this choice, and consequently, these accounts make different predictions about the frequency of Chevron application and the pattern of
validation in non-Chevron cases. A simple realist account assumes that
justices enjoy wide discretion in deciding whether to apply Chevron
and that they employ Chevron deference strategically. The realist account predicts that justices will be more inclined to apply Chevron
when they want to uphold agency action, and less inclined to apply
Chevron when they want to invalidate agency action. In the realist
account, the rate at which justices vote to apply Chevron should be
higher when the agency action matches the justice's ideological pref30
For an early discussion, see Schuck and Elliott, 1990 Duke L J at 1057-59 (cited in note
6) (concluding that Chevron led to an increase in deference to agency decisions).
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erences and lower when it does not match. An unmitigated realist
view also predicts that legal doctrines, such as Chevron deference, are
objects for judicial manipulation rather than binding constraints on
justices' efforts to implement their preferred policies. Therefore, a realist prediction is that validation rates should correlate with ideological preferences, irrespective of whether the Court applies Chevron. In
cases not involving Chevron deference, judicial behavior should be
essentially the same.
In contrast, a simple doctrinal account assumes that the doctrine
imposes sharp limits on the justices' ability to refuse to apply Chevron
and that there is nothing like unbounded freedom to apply Chevron as
the justices see fit. In the doctrinal view, the rate of Chevron application should not vary much across individual justices and should not
correlate with the ideological likings of the justices. Moreover, the
doctrinalist perceives Chevron itself as a restraint on judicial policymaking. This view predicts that Chevron, as a doctrine of deference,
should weaken the correlation between the politics of the agency decision and the justice's willingness to validate that decision. In this account, the justices should more readily vote according to their ideological preferences when the Court does not apply Chevron than when it
does. Ideological voting should be less apparent in Chevron cases than
non-Chevron cases.

Our data permit tests of these predictions. Again, the number of
cases in which the Court reviewed an agency decision but did not apply Chevron is small-15 cases, representing 120 votes by justices in
the sample. Our analysis is therefore speculative, but we can advance a
few tentative conclusions. First, Table 5 reports the rates at which the
three groups of justices voted to apply Chevron. There is little variation overall in the rate at which the three groups of justices voted to
apply Chevron. All three groups voted to apply Chevron more than
three-fourths of the time, and their rates differ by at most 6 percentage points. Moreover, the largest difference in their overall rates of
voting to apply Chevron arises not in the two most ideologically distant groups-SSBG and RST-but between the liberals and the moderates-SSBG and OK. These estimates suggest that the discretion of
the justices to apply Chevron is rather limited.31

31 See, for example, Barnhart v Walton, 535 US 212, 221-22 (2002); United States v Mead
Corp, 533 US 218, 231-34 (2001) (holding that a limited class of agency interpretations do not
merit Chevron deference).
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TABLE 5

Supreme Court Justices' Rates of Voting to Apply Chevron:
By Groups of Justices and by Party of Current President
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)

Justice
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, & Ginsburg

Total
(1)
.813
(.024)
[273]

Party of Current President
Republican
Difference
Democratic
(3)
of (2)-(3):
(2)
.049
.831
.781
(.049)
(.028)
(.042)
[177]
[96]

O'Connor & Kennedy

.759
(.034)
[162]

.750
(.044)
[100]

.774
(.054)
[62]

-.024
(.070)

Rehnquist, Scalia, & Thomas

.783
(.027)
[235]

.757
(.035)
[148]

.828
(.041)
[87]

-.071
(.056)

Difference of SSBG-OK

Difference of SSBG-RST

Difference of OK-RST

.054

.081

.007

(.040)

(.050)

(.068)

.030
(.036)

.074
(.045)

-.046
(.059)

-.024

-.007

-.053

(.043)

(.056)

(.066)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

The estimates in Table 5 therefore offer substantial support for
the doctrinal view, but when the data are decomposed according to
whether the agency decision was liberal, a modest ideological pattern
emerges. When the agency decision is liberal, the rate at which the
SSBG group applies the Chevron framework rises by 5 percentage
points and that at which the RST group applies it falls by about 7 percentage points. The movement in the rate of the OK group is
smaller-only 2 percentage points. Although none of these differences
is statistically significant, the direction of the small fluctuations is consistent with the ideological preferences of the justices. The results in Table
5 suggest that the decision to apply Chevron is ideologically contested
by the justices.
Table 6 assesses the more important prediction of the doctrinal
and realist hypotheses by reporting comparisons of Chevron and nonChevron cases according to whether the agency decision was liberal.
The table consists of three panels, one for each of the three groups of
justices. It is readily apparent that the justices' validation rates in Chevron cases are, for the most part, not substantially different from those in
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non-Chevron cases. For the SSBG group, the validation rates in nonChevron cases are actually slightly higher than in Chevron cases, but
the gap is small-at most 6.5 percentage points in cases when the
agency decision was not liberal. In non-Chevron cases, the frequency
of the SSBG group's voting to validate correlates with the political
content of the agency decision about as closely as it does in Chevron
cases. In particular, the magnitude of the fluctuation in the SSBG
group's validation votes between liberal and nonliberal agency decisions is, at 26.6 and 22.8 percentage points, roughly the same in Chevron and non-Chevron cases.
Panel III shows an analogous pattern for the RST group. In Chevron cases, the RST group on average votes about 10 percentage points
more often to validate than in non-Chevron cases, but given the small
number of observations, this difference is not statistically significant.
As Table 2 showed, the RST group validates nonliberal agency actions
under Chevron at a rate more than 30 percentage points higher than
that of liberal agency actions. Strikingly, Panel III of Table 6 displays a
similar pattern among non-Chevron cases; there, the RST group votes
to validate a liberal agency decision about 37 percentage points less often.
In contrast, the OK group's validation rate varies little with the
political content of the agency decision, and as shown in Panel II of
Table 6, this pattern holds true regardless of whether the Court applied Chevron. The most noteworthy difference in the OK group's
votes is the overall gap between Chevron and non-Chevron cases in the
rate of validation. The overall rate of validation by these justices is
about 30 percentage points higher in Chevron than non-Chevron cases.
The OK group therefore exhibits a very different pattern from either
the SSBG or RST groups. For the OK group, the political content of
the agency decision matters little in likelihood of validation, but
whether the Court applies Chevron matters a great deal. For the
SSBG and RST groups, the political content of the agency decision
bears a strong relationship to the likelihood of validation, but the application of Chevron does not.
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TABLE 6

Validation Rates of Supreme Court Justices: By Groups of Justices,
by Ideological Content of Agency Decision, and by Chevron Status
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
I. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Difference of
Not Liberal
Liberal
(1)
(2)
(1)-(2):
.266**
.582
.848
(.058)
(.056)
(.030)
[79]
[145]

Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

.875
(.059)
[32]

(B) Court Did Not
Apply Chevron

Difference of (A)-(B):

.647
(.119)
[17]

-.027

-.065

(.070)

(.133)

.228*
(.119)

II. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Difference of
Not Liberal
Liberal
(1)-(2):
(2)
(1)
-.074
.720
.646
(.085)
(.064)
(.053)

[82]

[50]

(B) Court Did Not
Apply Chevron

.389
(.118)
[18]

.333
(.142)
[12]

Difference of (A)-(B):

.257**

.387**

(.126)

(.148)

.056
(.186)

III. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

(B) Court Did Not
Apply Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Difference of
Not Liberal
Liberal
(1)-(2).
(2)
(1)
-.305**
.761
.455
(.071)
(.051)
(.045)
[71]
[123]
.320
(.095)
[25]

.688
(.120)
[16]

-.368**
(.153)

.073
.135
(.121)
(.109)
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
Difference of (A)-(B):
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In sum, the evidence of Tables 5 and 6 does not provide unqualified support for either the doctrinal or the realist position. Table 6
shows that the validation rates of the political wings of the Court, the
SSBG and RST groups, appear as ideological in non-Chevron cases as
in Chevron cases. This finding is consistent with a simple realist view
that the Chevron doctrine fails to constrain the political preferences of
justices. However, Table 6 also reports that the validation rates of the
SSBG are slightly lower-and those of the RST group are slightly
higher-in Chevron cases than in non-Chevron cases. The validation
rate of the OK group in Chevron cases is roughly 30 percentage points
higher than in non-Chevron cases. Although the sample size is small, a
doctrinalist might view these latter findings as consistent with Chevron encouraging, if not achieving, convergence in the validation rates
of the justices. Again, the self-selected application of Chevron means
that it is hazardous to infer its causal effect on validation rates simply
by comparing outcomes in Chevron and non-Chevron cases. Table 5
shows that the frequency of Chevron application is itself difficult to
interpret. A doctrinalist could contrast the modest ideological patterns
in the rates of Chevron application with the strong ideological patterns in validation under Chevron and conclude that even ideologically motivated jurists are unable to escape the application of Chevron. The riposte of the realist is the application of Chevron matters
little, given that Chevron does not succeed in dampening the ideological patterns in validation rates.
Because of the limited number of cases and because the Court
has some discretion in deciding whether to apply Chevron, any generalizations must be tentative. But the evidence supports the view that
among the most ideological justices, Chevron is not associated with
increased validation of agency interpretations of law. In this respect,
the data are quite inconsistent with the view, tempting to some doctrinalists, that Chevron and other deference doctrines should have a strong
effect on judicial behavior. On the contrary, any effect of Chevron
seems to be very modest.
III. COURTS OF APPEALS AND CHEVRON
It might be thought that for present purposes, the Supreme Court
is unique. The Court decides the most difficult and controversial cases,
and perhaps it is unsurprising to find that in those cases, political convictions matter in the application of the Chevron framework. On the
courts of appeals, the effect of such convictions might be expected to
be dampened. We now explore whether our conclusions about the Supreme Court's application of Chevron can be generalized by seeing
whether the patterns persist in the courts of appeals.
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A. Data and Method
To isolate agency decisions that were likely to generate politically
salient issues, attention was restricted to challenges to interpretations
of law by two important agencies known for producing politically contentious decisions: the EPA and the NLRB. These data were struc-

tured into a file of judge-by-case observations, and we limit our attention in this analysis to cases in which the courts applied Chevron. The
data set therefore contains a total of 680 votes-369 by Republican
appointees and 311 by Democratic appointees. As with the Supreme
Court, so too here: the coding decisions were simple and crude. We
employ the same proxies of the ideological content of the agency decision: whether the decision was liberal or not, and the party of the current president. 32
In the Supreme Court, much is known about the individual justices,

and the data themselves were largely consistent with these assessments.
By contrast, circuit court judges are vastly greater in number and relatively less well known. To test for the effect of politics, we classified

those judges according to the party of the president who nominated
them to the circuit court. For ease of exposition, we refer to33these
judges as "Democratic appointees" or "Republican appointees.,

32
We originally collected the relevant data for the EPA, the NLRB, and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), asking a group of research assistants to do the relevant
coding. After they did their work, we collected the cases anew and recoded them ourselves for
the EPA and the NLRB. The patterns we found were quite similar to those of the group of research assistants, with variations in the numbers but no substantial changes in the basic patterns.
We also attempted to recode the FCC cases, but found the enterprise extremely difficult, in large
part because of the number of parties and issues, and the consequent difficulty of characterizing
FCC decisions in ideological terms. As a result of that difficulty, we dropped the FCC data from
our analysis. Interestingly, however, the group of research assistants found patterns for the FCC
that were entirely consistent with the basic patterns for the EPA and the NLRB-with validation
rates that did not vary between Republican and Democratic appointees, but with voting patterns
that showed an effect of ideology (higher validation rates by Republican appointees for Republican
than Democratic administrations, and for conservative than liberal agency decisions, and the opposite
patterns for Democratic appointees). The numbers here are available from the authors on request.
33 It is tempting and plausible to object to any claim that Republican appointees are "conservative" and that Democratic appointees are "liberal." But for purposes of analysis, it is not
easy to develop simple, readily available alternatives for classifying judges. (Some efforts in this
vein have been made. See generally, for example, Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:
Genderand Collegial Decisionmaking in the FederalAppellate Courts, 114 Yale L J 1759 (2005).)
To the extent that our coding scheme misclassifies conservative judges as liberals and vice versa,
these errors will reduce the likelihood that we detect differences in deference rates of the two
groups. As we discern some patterns with this coding scheme, the error of misclassification is
likely not too severe.
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B.

Summary Statistics

Tables 7 and 8 display summary statistics on the validation rates
in circuit courts, overall and stratified by the two measures of the ideological content of the agency decision. Column (1) of Table 7 reports
the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees.
We can readily see that the overall average validation rate of the circuit judges in Chevron cases, at about 64 percent, is roughly similar to
that of the Supreme Court justices, which averaged 67 percent. Interestingly, the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican
appointees to the circuit courts are quite similar. The validation rate of
the average Democratic appointee is higher than that of the average
Republican appointee by only 0.03 of a percentage point, which is an
insignificant difference.
TABLE 7

Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges by
Party of Appointing President in Chevron Cases:
Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
Difference of
(2)
(3)
M-(3):
.739
.511
.228**
(.033)
(.043)
(.054)
[176]
[135]

Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Total
(1)
.640
(.027)
[3111

(B) Republican

.637
(.025)
[369]

.595
(.033)
[220]

.698
(.038)
[149]

Difference of (A)-(B)

.003
(.037)

.143**
(.048)

-.187**
(.057)

-.103**
(.051)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

The next columns of Table 7 break out the validation rates by
whether the agency decision is liberal or not. These decompositions show
that the overall validation rates mask significant correlations between the
political party of the appointing president and the ideological content
of the agency decision. When the agency decision is liberal, the validation rates of Democratic appointees are almost 23 percentage points
higher, and those of Republican appointees are more than 10 percentage
points lower. Although the Democratic appointees appear somewhat
more responsive to the political content of the case, the difference
across the two types of judges (that is, 12.5 = 22.8 - 10.3) is not so
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great that it permits a conclusion that the validation rates of judges of
one party fluctuate by more-in a statistical sense-than those of
judges of the other party. Instead, the validation rates of all circuit
judges display an almost seesawing pattern according to the identity
of the challenging party.
A notable difference between the patterns observed here and
those among the Supreme Court justices is that the magnitude of the
fluctuation in the validation rates between liberal and nonliberal agency
decisions is about 10 percentage points lower among the circuit court
judges. The validation rates in cases involving liberal agency actions
appear to account for most of this difference. The validation rates of
Democratic appointees in cases with liberal agency decisions do not
rise as high as those of the SSBG group, and the validation rates of
Republican appointees in these cases do not fall as low as those of the
RST group. The less prominent ideological pattern in the circuit court
data may be due to our less precise measures of the judicial ideology
of circuit court judges. The use of the political party of the nominating
president is an imperfect measure because some conservative judges
were nominated by Democratic presidents, just as some liberal judges
were nominated by Republican presidents. Even with this crude measure, these results provide further support for the realist hypothesis.
TABLE

8

Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges by Party of
Appointing and by Current President in Chevron Cases
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Total
(1)
.640
(.027)
[311]

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2)-43):
.698
.605
.093*
(.043)
(.035)
(.056)
[116]
[195]

(B) Republican

.637
(.025)
[369]

.592
(.038)
[1691

.675
(.033)
[2001

Difference of (A)-(B)

.003
(.037)

.107*
(.058)

-.070
(.048)

-.083*
(.050)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Table 8 reports validation rates when the party of the current
president is the proxy for the ideological content of the agency decision. The pattern for Republican nominees here is similar to that in
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the prior table, but the validation rates of Democratic nominees exhibit less movement here-about 9 percentage points rather than the
23 percentage points shown in Table 7. As was seen with the Supreme
Court justices, the party of the current president is probably a less accurate measure of the ideological content of an agency decision. Although the amplitude of the fluctuations is reduced here, the seesawing pattern that is consistent with the realist hypothesis persists.
In sum, the results for the circuit courts, like those for the Supreme
Court, provide strong evidence that the political predispositions of the
judges influence the judicial review of agency interpretations.4 Overall,
Democratic appointees validate at roughly the same rate as the Republican appointees. These overall figures obscure correlations between a judge's political party and the ideological content of the
agency interpretations. When the cases are classified according to
whether the agency decision is liberal, the validation rates of both Republican and Democratic appointees exhibit a strong seesawing pattern,
with validation rates of the judges of each party rising when the content
of the agency decision is closer to their political preference.
When the data are decomposed by the party of the current president, a similar but less pronounced pattern is apparent. When a Democrat rather than a Republican occupies the presidency, the validation rates of Republican appointees fall by about 8 percentage points
and those of Democratic appointees rise by about 9 percentage points.
Therefore, when a Democrat is president, the validation rates of Republican appointees are on average lower than those of Democratic
appointees, and when a Republican is president the opposite is true.
The results for circuit court judges thus provide support for the realist
model, but as with the Supreme Court justices, it is far from a complete explanation, simply because judicial politics cannot account for
all of the patterns that we observe.
C.

Chevron Review in Circuit Courts: The Power of Panels

Across a range
play a role, a federal
vote in a predictably
judges appointed by

of legal issues in which ideology is expected to
circuit judge has been found to be more likely to
ideological way when sitting on a panel with two
a president of the same political party." For con-

34 Again, we used regression analysis to examine the robustness of these patterns to other
factors potentially bearing on the likelihood that a judge votes to defer. We forgo discussion of
those estimates here, except to say that the patterns apparent in the summary statistics are robust to controlling for the dates, the circuit court, and type of agency involved in the case.
35 See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev 301, 305, 316-29 (2004)
(noting that "Democratic appointees, sitting with two Democratic appointees, are about twice as
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venience, we refer to these correlations between politicized voting and
panel composition as "panel effects."
This subsection examines the latter mechanism more fully. Focusing on the data from the courts of appeals, we test whether panel effects persist in cases where a circuit court applied Chevron.3 The most
important lesson is that both Democratic and Republican appointees
show far more political voting patterns when they are sitting on unified panels. When the panels are divided, the role of politics is greatly
dampened.
FIGURE 1

Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases, by
Agency and by Party of Appointing President
80.0 ----
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican appointees, sitting with two
Republican appointees").
36 The analysis differs from that of Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev 301 (cited
in note 35), in several important respects. The earlier analysis examined the role of panel composition in cases involving controversial issues that were "especially likely to reveal divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees," such as affirmative action and campaign finance.
Id at 304. In contrast, Chevron is intended to reduce, even minimize, divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees. Although the Sunstein et al study examined EPA cases, it considered only an expanded version of Richard Revesz's sample of EPA cases from the D.C. Circuit. See id at 322-23, 345-47 (discussing the sample used); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,83 Va L Rev 1717 (1997) (examining the impact of
judges' ideology on judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit in environmental cases). The current data includes EPA -as well as NLRB and FCC cases -from all circuits.
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Figures 1 and 2 present basic facts about validation rates. Figure 1
shows validation rates by the agency and by the party of the judge's
appointing president. When the judges' votes are not decomposed by
political affiliation, the overall validation rates by agency vary relatively little: for the EPA and NLRB, those rates are 61.7 percent and
70.1 percent, respectively. Figure 1 also shows small differences across
the party of the judge's appointing president within each type of case.
These modest differences are consistent with the near equivalence in the
validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees overall in Table 7. The validation rates of Republican and Democratic appointees
in EPA cases differ by less than 2 percentage points, though in NLRB
cases, Democratic appointees validate at a rate nearly 9 percentage
points higher than Republican appointees.
FIGURE 2
Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President
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74.2
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667 64.2
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.
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These patterns conform to general impressions of the contentiousness of the issues confronting these agencies. The NLRB has the
wider validation gap between judges of different political parties, and
labor-management relations are traditionally a subject in which views
align along the conventional left-right spectrum. Environmental issues
may be slightly less polarizing. Consistent with this impression, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees are nearly
identical in EPA cases.
Figure 2 displays the validation rates of court of appeals judges
by the political composition of the appellate panel. This figure pools
the cases pertaining to all three agencies. Two patterns are striking.
First, a moderate panel effect characterizes Democratic appointees.
When sitting with either one or two Republican appointees, a Democratic appointee validates about 61 percent of the time. Moreover, in
that circumstance, the validation rate of the Democratic appointee is
indistinguishable from that of her Republican colleagues. But when
sitting with two other Democrats, the average validation rate of a
Democratic appointee jumps by more than 12 percentage points. Prior
research established that across a broad range of issues, ideological
voting increases with the addition of any like-minded judge to a panel."
In this sample of Chevron cases, strong ideological patterns in voting
emerge only when all three judges on a panel belong to the same party.Second, the overall validation rates of Republican appointees appear nearly invariant to panel composition. Their validation rates range
from about 61 percent to 67 percent -a movement of only 6 percentage
points. These estimates contrast with earlier findings that, for judges of
both political parties, the frequency with which they voted in stereotypically ideological ways correlated with the composition of the panel. 9
As with several of the Supreme Court justices, stability in overall
validation rates could mask substantial variation in validation when
the ideological content of the agency decision is examined. Therefore,
the validation rates were further decomposed by our two proxies for
the political content of the agency decision. Tables 9 and 10 present
these decompositions. In Table 9, the cases were classified according to
whether the agency decision was liberal, and in Table 10, they were
37 See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316-29 (cited in note 35) (showing
that party and panel influences on the votes of individual judges obtain in a number of issue areas).
38 In the overall deference rates displayed in Figure 2, this pattern is apparent only for
Democratic appointees. But when the data are also stratified by political content of the agency
decision, as in Tables 9 and 10, this pattern characterizes Republican appointees as well.
39
See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316-29 (cited in note 35) (demonstrating that the rates of ideological votes by Republican judges differed by 14 percentage points,
depending on the composition of the panel).
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classified according to whether the current president was a Democrat
or Republican. The results are remarkably consistent across these two
classifications, and here the role of panel effects becomes more striking.
TABLE 9
Validation Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing President,
by Ideological Content of Agency Decision, and by Panel Composition
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Panel
Composition
DDD

Total
.742
(.054)

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Difference of
Not Liberal
Liberal
(1)-(2):
(2)
(1)
.315*
.542
.857
(.107)
(.104)
(.055)

[661

[42]

[24]

(B) Democratic

DDR or
RRD

.612
(.031)
[245]

.701
(.040)
[1341

.505
(.048)
[1111

.197**
(.062)

(C) Republican

DDR or
RRD

.622
(.031)
[249]

.647
(.041)
[139]

.591
(.047)
[110]

.057
(.062)

(D) Republican

RRR

.667
(.043)
[120]

.506
(.056)
[81]

1.000
(.000)
[39]

-.494**
(.081)

Difference of (A)-(B):

.130*
(.066)

.156**
(.077)

.037
(.113)

Difference of (A)-(C):

.112*
(.066)

.210**
(.080)

-.049
(.112)

Difference of (A)-(D):

.076
(.071)

.351"*
(.087)

-.458**
(.081)

Difference of (B)-(C):

-.010
(.044)

.054
(.057)

-.086
(.067)

Difference of (B)-(D):

-.054
(.054)

.195**
(.067)

-.495**
(.081)

Difference of (C)-(D):

-.044
(.054)

.141**
(.068)

-.409**
(.079)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

In Table 9, the validation rates of Democrats who sit on panels
with two other Democratic appointees are nearly a mirror image of
those of Republican appointees who sit on panels with two other Republican appointees. These fine decompositions of the sample reduce

the number of observations and make it difficult to make firm inferences about magnitudes, but strong patterns emerge. Here is the most

The University of Chicago Law Review

[73:823

striking finding: a Democratic appointee sitting with two Democratic
appointees votes to uphold a liberal decision more than 30 percentage
points more often than a conservative one-and a Republican appointee sitting with two Republican appointees votes to uphold a conservative decision more than 30 percentage points more often than a
liberal one. For both Republican and Democratic appointees, the validation rates rise from about 50 percent when the judge's party affiliation does not match the political content of the agency decision to
over 80 percent when it does match.
When judges sit on panels with at least one judge of the other
party, the political content of the agency decision appears to induce
much less fluctuation in the validation rates. A Democratic appointee
sitting on a panel with either one or two Republican appointees is
about 20 percentage points more likely to vote to validate when the
agency decision is liberal. A Republican appointee sitting on a panel
with either one or two Democratic appointees is only about 6 percentage points less likely to vote to validate when the agency decision
is liberal. Politically mixed panels therefore dampen the size of ideological fluctuations in validation rates.
Table 10 presents analogous calculations when the cases are organized by the party of the current president. The patterns here are
similar and in a way stunning. A Democratic appointee sitting with
two other Democrats votes to validate about 30 percentage points less
often when the president is a Republican than when he is a Democrat.
A Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees
votes to validate about 30 percentage points less often when the president is a Democrat than when he is Republican.
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TABLE 10

Validation Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing President,
by Party of Current President, and by Panel Composition
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Panel
Composition
DDD

Party of Current President
Difference of
Republican
Democratic
(1)-(2):
(2)
(1)
.308**
.644
.952
(.111)
(.072)
(.048)
[45]
[21]

(B) Democratic

DDR or
RRD

.642
(.049)
[95]

.593
(.040)
[150]

.049
(.064)

(C) Republican

DDR or
RRD

.632
(.047)

.615

(.041)

.017
(.062)

[1061

[143]

.524

.825

(.063)
[63]

(.051)
[57]

Difference of (A)-(B):

.310**
(.108)

.051
(.083)

Difference of (A)-(C):

.320**

.029
(.083)

Difference of (A)-(D):

.429**
(.114)

-.180**

Difference of (B)-(C):

.010
(.068)

-.022
(.057)

Difference of (B)-(D):

.118
(.080)

-.231**

Difference of (C-(D):

.108
(.078)

-.209**
(.072)

(D) Republican

RRR

(.108)

-.
301*

(.082)

(.086)

(.072)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

The first column of Table 9 shows that for judges sitting on mixed
panels, the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees are nearly identical-61 and 62 percent, respectively. The
patterns are less clear, however, when the validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels are further
broken out by the measures for the ideological content of the agency
decision. Table 9 shows that especially for Democratic appointees, the
validation rates of judges sitting on politically mixed panels exhibit
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some sensitivity to the political content of the agency decision. Democratic appointees sitting on mixed panels vote to validate about 20
percentage points more often when the agency decision is liberal
rather than conservative, but this difference is still less than that of
Democratic appointees sitting with two other Democratic appointees.
Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels vote to validate
nonliberal agency decisions about 6 percentage points more often
than liberal ones. In contrast, Table 10 reports that the validation rates of
Democratic and Republican appointees sitting on mixed panels appear
invariant to the party of the current president. These results indicate
that the pattern of ideological voting by judges sitting on politically
unified panels is robust to either measure of the political content of
the agency decision. In contrast, the pattern of ideological voting by
judges sitting on politically mixed panels appears muted in Table 9 and
disappears altogether in Table 10.40
These estimates show that, consistent with prior research, panel
composition has a sizable effect on judicial voting patterns. But the influence of panel composition has a somewhat more limited effect in
Chevron cases than it does in the consideration of other legal issues.
Prior research showed that for many ideologically contentious issues,
panel composition influenced the likelihood that judges vote in predictably ideological ways, even when the panels were a mix of Republicans and Democrats." In contrast, when a court applies Chevron's
two-step framework, ideological tendencies in overall deference rates
appear restricted to appellate panels composed of three judges from
the same political party. The addition of even just one judge from the
other political party renders overall validation rates of Democratic and
Republican appointees nearly indistinguishable. Whether it also eliminates fluctuation in validation rates across the political content of
agency decisions for judges sitting on politically mixed panels is unclear; these estimates are sensitive to which measure of political content is used.
These estimates suggest that most of the difference in the validation rates of Republican and Democratic appointees arises from panels consisting exclusively of judges from one political party. For politically mixed panels, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican
judges are very similar to each other; all but one of the differences are
10 percentage points or less and are statistically insignificant. The only
40 The regression analysis was used to verify the robustness of the patterns reported in
Tables 7 through 10 to the control variables already discussed in note 34. We forgo reporting
those results in detail, except to express our confidence that the patterns we discuss here persist
after controlling for those other factors.
41 See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316-29 (cited in note 35).
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mixed panel has a validation rate 20 percentage points higher when
the agency decision is liberal rather than conservative. Even this difference, however, appears modest when compared to the differences
of more than 30 percentage points for politically unified panels. It follows that when a circuit court applies Chevron, the influence of panel
composition on judicial decisionmaking appears largely cabined to politically unified panels. These patterns suggest the possibility that Chevron is succeeding in eliminating the influence of circuit judges' political preferences in review of agency decisions, at least within the domain of politically mixed panels.

D. Liberal and Conservative Voting
As with the Supreme Court, we reclassified the data in terms of
liberal and conservative voting, and similar patterns emerged, perhaps
in even more striking form.
TABLE 11
Liberal Vote Rates of Circuit Court Appointees by Party
of Appointing President and by Current President in Chevron Cases
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Current President
Difference of
Republican
Democratic
(2)-(3):
(3)
(2)
.069
.646
.716
(.055)
(.034)
(.042)
[1951
[116]

Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Total
(1)
.672
(.027)
[311]

(B) Republican

.499
(.026)
[369]

.473
(.039)
[1691

.520
(.035)
[200]

Difference of (A)-(B):

.173**
(.037)

.242**
(.058)

.126**
(.049)

-.047
(.052)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Table 11 presents rates of liberal voting for Democratic and Republican appointees overall and by the party of the current president.
Column (1) of Table 11 shows that, consistent with expectations, Democratic appointees are 17 percentage points more likely to offer a liberal vote in Chevron cases, and this difference is statistically significant.
The remaining columns of Table 11 show that the rates of liberal
voting vary modestly with political control of the White House. Democratic appointees are about 7 percentage points more likely to vote
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in a liberal way when a Democrat holds the presidency, and Republicans are about 5 percentage points less likely to vote in a liberal way
when a Republican serves as president. These differences imply that
when a Democrat is president, the average Democratic appointee votes
in a liberal way about 24 percentage points more often than the average Republican appointee does. But even during a Republican presidency, the higher rate of liberal voting by Democratic appointees-by
nearly 13 percentage points-is statistically different from the rate of
liberal voting of Republican appointees.
FIGURE 3
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

Figure 3 examines liberal voting rates of circuit judges in Chevron
cases by the political composition of the appellate panel. In contrast to
the validation rates shown in Figure 2, a strong panel effect characterizes both Democratic and Republican appointees. Although some of
the differences are modest, both Republican and Democratic appoint-
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ees are more likely to vote in a liberal way as the number of Democratic appointees on the panel rises. This increase in rates of liberal voting occurs across all panels and, unlike the pattern seen in the validation rates, is not limited to the panels comprised only of Democratic
appointees.
Even in the presence of these panel effects, Democratic appointees appear more liberal than their Republican counterparts sitting on
similarly constituted panels. Even in the politically mixed panels that
featured similar validation rates by Democratic and Republican appointees, sizable differences in liberal voting rates are present. The difference in the liberal voting rate between Democratic appointees sitting with one Democratic and one Republican appointee (66.5 percent), and that of Republican appointees also sitting with one Democratic and one Republican appointee (55.3 percent) is statistically different from zero. For every combination of panel colleagues, the Democratic appointee is more likely to cast a liberal vote than a Republican appointee is by at least 10 percentage points, and each of these
differences is statistically different from zero.
Table 12 decomposes the rates of liberal voting by the political
makeup of the appellate panel and by the party of the current president. Consistent with previous tables, the voting patterns of politically
unified panels account for much of the difference in the aggregate
liberal voting rates of Democratic and Republican appointees. As reported in column (1) of Table 12, a Democratic appointee sitting with
two other Democratic appointees on average votes in the liberal way
17 percentage points more often than when she sits with at least one
Republican. For Republican appointees, this pattern is reversed. A
Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees
on average votes in the liberal way 17 percentage points less often
than when she sits with least one Democrat. Here is the most striking
finding: there is a gap of about 40 percentage points in liberal voting
rates between the votes of Democratic appointees on exclusively Democraticpanels and those of Republican appointees on exclusively Republicanpanels.
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TABLE 12
Liberal Voting Rates in Chevron Cases by Party of Appointing
President, by Party of Current President, and by Panel Composition
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Appointing
President
(A) Democratic

Panel
Composition
DDD

Total
(1)
.803
(.049)
[66]

(B) Democratic

(C) Republican

(D) Republican

DDR or
RRD

DDR or
RRD

RRR

[21]

[45]

.637
(.031)
[245]

.705
(.047)

.593
(.040)

[95]

[150]

.554
(.032)
[249]

.585
(.048)

.531
(.042)

[106]

[143]

.383

.286
(.057)
[63]

(.067)

.166**

.057

.229**

(.065)

(.no)

(.080)

(.045)
[1201
Difference of (A)-(B):

Party of Current President
Democratic Republican
Difference
(2)
(3)
of (2)-(3):
.762
.822
-.060
(.095)
(.058)
(.106)

.491

-

.249**
(.067)

.117
(.116)

.291**
(.081)

Difference of (A)-(D):

--

.420**
(.070)

.476**
(.114)

.331**
(.091)

Difference of (BHC):

--

.082*
(.044)

.120**
(.068)

.062
(.058)

.253**
(.054)

.419**
(.074)

(.077)

.171**
(.058)

.229**
(.076)

.040
(.079)

Difference of (C)-(D):

--

--

.053
(.064)

-.206**
(.088)

[57]

Difference of (AHC):

Difference of (B)-(D):

.112**
(.063)

.102

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

The rest of Table 12 indicates that, after controlling for the composition of the appellate panel, the party of the current president correlates inconsistently with liberal voting rates. The liberal voting rates
of Republican appointees sitting on politically unified panels correlate
strongly with the party of the current president, but the liberal voting
rates of Democratic appointees sitting on politically unified panels do
not. For a Republican appointee on a politically mixed panel, a change
in the party of the presidency implies a movement in the rate of lib-
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eral voting of about 5 percentage points. For a Democratic appointee on
a politically mixed panel, this fluctuation is about 11 percentage points.
E. Mixed Panels and Unified Panels Once More
We have found that judges show much more ideological voting
on politically unified panels, and that this pattern explains many of the
ideological tendencies observed in the aggregate data. But the comparisons across panels establish four specific findings that are worth
underlining here. First, the composition of appellate panels has a much
greater effect on rates of liberal voting than on rates of votes to validate. This distinction is clear in a comparison of Figure 2 to Figure 3,
as well as Tables 9 and 10 to Table 12.
Second, when ideological voting appears, it is concentrated in politically unified panels. In Tables 9 and 10, the validation rates of Republican appointees sitting on politically mixed panels are insensitive
to either measure of the ideological content of the agency action. On
mixed panels, then, Republican appointees simply do not show ideological voting. The pattern is not consistent for Democratic appointees.
When our coding of the ideological content of the agency decision is
used, Democratic appointees show a degree of ideological voting on
mixed panels; when the party of the current administration is used,
Democratic appointees show no such tendency. But when a political
appointee of either party sits on a politically unified panel, her rate of
liberal voting exhibits a strong ideological tendency.
Third, the panel effects on liberal voting rates are generally well
ordered, in the sense that the patterns are in line with those observed
in many areas of the law.'2 An exception is the behavior of Republican
appointees on panels including one or instead two Democratic appointees. Usually judges show a "collegial concurrence," in accordance
with which Republican appointees display relatively liberal voting patterns when sitting with two Democratic appointees, and Democratic
appointees display fairly conservative voting patterns when sitting
with two Republican appointees." And indeed this is the pattern we
observe in Figure 4 for Democratic appointees in EPA cases and Republican appointees in NLRB cases. But in the data as a whole, and in
EPA cases, Republican appointees show the same rate of liberal voting regardless of whether they are sitting with one or two Democratic
appointees.
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See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 316-18 (cited in note 35).
See id.
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FIGURE 4
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Judges in Chevron Cases,
by Panel Composition, Agency, and Party of Appointing President
100.
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the
lightly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

Similarly, Democratic appointees in NLRB cases show nearly the
same rate of liberal voting regardless of whether they sit with one or
two Republican appointees. The most obvious explanation for this
unusual finding is that Republican appointees in EPA cases and Democratic appointees in NLRB cases have strong convictions, so that
they are willing to dissent from two colleagues from the other party.
Note, however, that the behavior of appointees in general is hardly impervious to panel influences; there is a very large difference between
their voting patterns on unified and mixed panels.
Fourth, the partisan composition of the panel seems to have little
influence on the overall rate of validation for both Democratic and
Republican appointees. But this appearance obscures stronger ideological patterns that emerge in finer decompositions of the data. In
particular, when validation rates are broken out by the political con-
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tent of the agency decision, panel composition appears to have a strong
influence on the degree of ideological voting. In Figure 2, the overall
validation rates of Republican appointees change little with the composition of the panel, and those of Democratic appointees move only
slightly, except when they sit on a politically unified panel. Yet when
the political content of the agency decision is considered, as in Tables
9 and 12, the validation rates of unified panels show strong ideological
propensities. The pattern is analogous to Table 7, where similar overall
rates of validation by Republican and Democratic appointees masked
pronounced ideological voting that became apparent when the data
were stratified according to the political content of the agency decision.
If this admittedly complex evidence is taken as a whole, it does
show that ideological voting is dampened, even if not eliminated, on
politically mixed panels. Although the data do not establish that Chevron itself is responsible for this compression in ideological voting in
validation rates, they do raise this as a serious possibility.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

A. Of Interpretation and Policymaking
What are the implications of these findings? At first glance, the
evidence seems to fortify the argument for a strong reading of Chevron. There is no reason to think that where statutes are ambiguous,
their meaning should depend on the composition of the panel that
litigants draw, or on the ideological predilections of the sitting judges.
If the resolution of statutory ambiguities turns on judgments of policy,
then those judgments ought to be made by the relevant agencies, not
by federal courts.
To understand this claim, it is important to return to the rationale
of Chevron itself. Strikingly, the Court did not justify its two-step inquiry by reference to the language or history of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Instead the Court referred to two pragmatic points:
judges lack expertise and they are not politically accountable. In interpreting law, the agency may "properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is."" In the Court's view, it would be appropriate for agencies operating under the Chief Executive, rather than judges, to resolve "competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved.., in light of everyday realities."
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Chevron, 467 US at 865.
Id at 865-66.
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What is most striking about this passage is the explicit suggestion that
resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about resolving "competing interests."
Building on these ideas, the most forceful defenses of Chevron
have insisted on two points. The first is that the resolution of statutory
ambiguities calls for a judgment of policy-one that should be made
by executive officials rather than by judges." The judgment of policy
might be informed by technical expertise, as, for example, when the
agency is entrusted with applying its specialized competence to disputed areas. Alternatively, the judgment might be purely normative, as,
for example, in the view that in the face of uncertainty, statutes should
be construed so as to fit with the outcome of cost-benefit analysis 7 or
to protect public health.4 Whether specialized competence or judgments of value are involved, agencies have a strong comparative advantage over courts, and deference is therefore the appropriate rule.
The second point is that the Supreme Court should adopt rules of
deference that counteract the potential balkanization of federal law.
This problem is likely to emerge if different courts of appeals, with their
different predilections, approach agency interpretations in an independent fashion. 49 In the abstract, Chevron should reduce the risk of
balkanization simply because judges have been instructed to defer to
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms. And indeed an obvious defense of Chevron's deference principle is that it decreases the
risk that similarly situated litigants will produce different substantive
law merely because of policy disagreements among lower court judges.
How does the evidence explored here bear on these questions?
At first glance, it emphatically supports the view that resolution of ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy. The difference between
Republican and Democratic appointees is simply not explicable in
46 See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron DoctrineRedefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 Viii Envir L J 1, 14 (2005) ("[I]t is
neither a legislative nor judicial function, but rather an executive function for an agency, acting
under presidential supervision, to answer statutory questions left open by Congress.").
47
See Executive Order 12291,3 CFR § 2(c)-(d) (1981) (ordering that "[r]egulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society" and that "[a]mong alternative
approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen").
48 This is one reading of the FDA's judgment in FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp, 529 US 120 (2000) (invalidating FDA regulations of tobacco promulgated after the FDA
determined that nicotine was a "drug" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). "The agency
believed that, because most tobacco consumers begin their use before reaching the age of 18,
curbing tobacco use by minors could substantially reduce the prevalence of addiction in future
generations and thus the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease." Id at 125.
49 See Strauss, 87 Colum L Rev at 1121-22 (cited in note 8) (arguing that Chevron prevents
balkanization by directing that ambiguous statutes be interpreted by one agency rather than
courts in twelve circuits).
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other terms. Within the Supreme Court, Chevron may or may not have
reduced the role of policy disagreement in judicial review of agency
interpretations of law. Unfortunately, its success on that count has
been at best partial, both within the Supreme Court and among the
lower courts. For this reason, it appears that federal judges have not
taken Chevron seriously enough.
At the same time, there is a continuing risk of balkanization of
federal law, if only because different panels will predictably arrive at
different results on the same questions, which by hypothesis involve
judgments of policy rather than law.'o In the abstract, those questions
should be answered by those with technical expertise or political accountability. They should not be answered by federal judges. In short,
the evidence seems to suggest the need for courts to adhere more
closely to the Chevron framework, so as to reduce the risk that regulatory law will reflect the preferences of the relevant panel.
The evidence explored here also has jurisprudential implications.
Consider, for example, Ronald Dworkin's influential account of law as
"integrity."5 Dworkin contends that interpretation, including statutory
interpretation,52 requires a judgment about "fit" with existing materials
and about "justification" of those materials; his conception of law as
integrity requires judges to put existing materials in their "best constructive light." 3 Where "fit" leaves more than one possibility, judges
have a degree of discretion. Everyone should agree that the executive,
no less than the judiciary, has a duty of "fit"; many of the hard cases
arise when the key question is which interpretation puts the law in its
"best constructive light."
But-and here is a question Dworkin does not ask-why should
courts be entrusted with the duty to carry out that task? In modern
government, courts are often less capable on that count than is the
executive, precisely because of its comparatively greater expertise and
accountability. In deciding how to understand the Endangered Species
Act, the Food and Drug Act, and the Clean Air Act, it would be puzzling to suggest that courts are in a particularly good position to identify the "best constructive light." The suggestion would be especially
puzzling if it turned out that Republican and Democratic nominees
Of course resolution of some ambiguities does depend on judgments of law. The only
claim made here, in the spirit of Chevron itself, is that where a statute is genuinely ambiguous, a
judgment of policy is inevitable. We do not attempt to unpack the complexities of "genuine
ambiguity" necessary to a full analysis of Chevron Step One. The data presented here strongly
suggest that policy judgments operate in the real-world operation of that step.
51 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap 1986).
52 See id at 313-54.
53 See generally id.
50
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systematically differed in their judgments about what the "best constructive light" reveals. If statutory interpretation often involves an
element of policymaking discretion-and the evidence so suggeststhe argument for a strong reading of Chevron is surely strengthened.
Nothing that we have said resolves the dispute over textualism in
statutory interpretation. Suppose, plausibly, that some of our results
are attributable to the fact that some judges follow "plain meaning"
whereas others do not; suppose, also plausibly, that some of our results
are driven by different attitudes toward bureaucracies in general. To
the extent that judges differ on these questions, differences in the application of the Chevron framework are inevitable. At a minimum,
however, we can suggest that to the extent that the differences are
rooted in political considerations, Chevron would best be implemented
in a way that dampens the role of those considerations.
B.

Tempting Counterarguments

1. Of lags and politics.
An initial response would suggest that the evidence does not, in
fact, support a decision to give greater discretionary authority to regulatory agencies. The response would have two components. First, a
relatively strong judicial role reduces the power of an incumbent
president to make many changes in a short period-it helps to stabilize the law. Second, a strong judicial role is not adequately characterized as a substitution of judicial judgment for executive judgments. If
the evidence is taken seriously, then a strong judicial role operates instead to extend the policymaking reach of a previous president. When
Clinton appointees take a strong hand against executive decisions in
the Bush Administration, or when Justices Scalia and Thomas take a
strong hand against the Clinton Administration, the views of an earlier
president are being given continuing authority. In the abstract, it is not
clear that this continuing authority is undesirable.
Insofar as this response emphasizes stability, it is not on strong
ground, simply because administrative law already ensures a high degree, and perhaps an excessively high degree, of stability. It is both time
consuming and difficult to make a regulation; often the process takes
two years or more." To say the least, new presidents cannot immediately change agency policy as they see fit. The "ossification" of rulemaking is a familiar problem in administrative law.5 The additional
54 Consider Stephen G. Breyer, et at, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy:Problems
Text, and Cases 731 (Aspen 5th ed 2002).
55 See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process,41 Duke L J 1385 (1992) (discussing the causes of and potential solutions to the problem
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delay that comes from the exercise of judicial policymaking authority-by appointees of presidents who are no longer in office-hardly
seems desirable. Indeed, that delay is a singularly odd way to slow down
executive decisions, because it depends on the (random) draw of judges
who are unsympathetic to the incumbent president on policy grounds.
The response is more interesting insofar as it emphasizes the evident fact that previous presidents are able to play a role in "freezing"
executive policy. The evidence clearly shows that presidential appointments have a continuing effect on regulatory policy insofar as judges
are sometimes skeptical of the policy initiatives of their successors.
But why is this desirable? If the Bush Administration is embarking on
a new policy in the domain of environmental protection or telecommunications, does it really make sense to say that it should be
"checked" by the policy preferences of judicial appointees of President Clinton? Unless the Bush Administration is violating the law or
acting arbitrarily, an affirmative answer is difficult to defend. To the
extent that the policy preferences of judicial appointees are driving
judicial decisions, there seems to be little to say on behalf of the existing situation.
2. The inevitability of politics.
A different response would suggest that whatever the strength of
the deference rule, political differences will break out on the margin
along which litigation occurs. Of course Republican appointees and
Democratic appointees would agree if the rule of deference were absolute-if judges were told that agency interpretations of law must be
upheld under all circumstances. But so long as there is some room for
review, political differences will matter at the point where that review
occurs. If, for example, the agency must be upheld unless the statute is
entirely without ambiguity, then litigants will challenge agency action
only when the statute is (arguably) entirely without ambiguity, and then
agencies will interpret statutes aggressively in their preferred directions. In the hard cases that ultimately arise, Democratic appointees
will disagree with Republican appointees in just the ways that we have
outlined here.
This conjecture cannot be ruled out of bounds. Under the current
version of Chevron, political differences play a substantial role; under

of "ossification"); Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 9-25 (Harvard 1990) (discussing the decline in rulemaking activity by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and attributing it to "the inertial force of the general political and legal culture
within which [the] regulatory regime [is] constructed and operated").
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a stronger version of Chevron, perhaps the data would look essentially
identical.
Suppose that the conjecture is right. Even if so, that stronger version would reflect a large-scale allocation of interpretive authority to
the executive, simply because the executive's interpretive discretion
would be increased. In the remaining cases in which that discretion is
subject to reasonable challenge, any political disagreement between
the two sets of judges will certainly be tolerable. The broadest point is
that if courts endorsed a strong view of the agency's power of interpretation, there would necessarily be a shift in interpretive power from
courts to the executive, and the rate of political disagreement among
judges should be reduced even if not eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION

In its actual application, the Chevron framework shows a large influence from the political convictions of federal judges. Of course
judges follow the law. But on the Supreme Court, disagreements about
the legality of agency interpretations have an uncomfortable political
component, simply because those disagreements often operate along
political lines. We have seen that the most conservative members of
the Court have been significantly more likely to uphold agency decisions under the two Bush Administrations than under the Clinton
Administration- and that the most liberal members of the Court
show the opposite tendency. We have also seen that under the Chevron framework, the liberal justices are more likely to uphold liberal
agency interpretations than conservative ones-and the conservative
justices show the opposite tendency.
On the courts of appeals, a rough equivalence in the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees obscures dramatic differences in their propensities to validate. These differences
emerge when the political content of agency decisions and the composition of appellate panels are considered. Democratic appointees are
more likely to uphold liberal decisions than conservative decisions by
23 percentage points, and Republican appointees are more likely to
uphold conservative decisions than liberal decisions by 11 percentage
points. The differences are still greater and perhaps most disturbing
when the composition of the panel is also examined. A Democratic appointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, is more likely to vote
to uphold a liberal decision than a conservative one by more than 30
percentage points-and a Republican appointee, sitting with two Re-
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publican appointees, is more likely to vote to uphold a conservative
decision than a liberal one by more than 40 percentage points.
Of course the normative questions are complex and contested,
and they have been explored only briefly here. But however those
questions are resolved, the empirical evidence is clear. Notwithstanding Chevron, the political convictions of federal judges are continuing
to play a large role in judicial review of agency interpretations of law.

56 For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, Yale L J (forthcoming 2006).
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APPENDIX: COMPARING JUSTICES ON THE SUPREME COURT
APPENDIX TABLE 1

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
A. Justice Stevens
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.710
.800

(.055)

(.107)

[69]

[15]

Difference of
-.10

(.128)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Ty'pe of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.829
.796
(.065)
(.058)
[35]
[49]
.806
(.072)
[31]

.632
(.079)
[38]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.033
(.088)

.175
(.109)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.846
.750
(.051)
(.078)
[52]
[32]

Difference of
(l)-(2):
.096
(.089)

.860

.462

.399**

(.053)
[43]

(.100)
[26]

(.103)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
B. Justice Souter
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.770
.643
(.054)
(.133)
[61]
[14]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.128
(.130)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.857
.750
(.060)
(.070)
[35]
[40]
.774
(.076)
[31]

.767
(.079)
[30]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.107
(.093)

.008
(.110)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.792
.815
(.059)
(.076)
[48]
[27]
.821
(.062)
[39]

.682
(.102)
[22]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.023
(.097)

.139
(.113)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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(cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
C. Justice Breyer
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.818
.900
(.059)
(.100)
[441
[101

Difference of
(l)-(2):
.082
(.133)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.852
.778
(.070)
(.082)
[27]
[27]
.833
(.078)
[24]

Difference of
(l)-(2):
.074
(.107)

.800
(.092)
[20]

.033
(.119)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.838
.765
(.061)
(.107)
[37]
[17]
.900
(.056)
[30]

.643
(.133)
[14]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.073
(.116)

.257**
(.129)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?

2006]

APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
D. Justice Ginsburg
I. Overall

1pe of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.740
.900
(.063)
(.100)
[50]
[10]

Difference of

(1)-(2):
-.160
(.148)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
'ype of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.906
.750
(.052)
(.083)
[32]
[28]
.724
(.084)
[29]

.762
(.095)
[21]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.156
(.096)

-.038
(.128)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.850
.800
(.057)
(.092)
[40]
[20]
0.818
(.068)
[33]

.588
(.123)
[17]

Difference of
1)42):
.050
(.104)

.230*
(.129)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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(cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
E. Justice O'Connor
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.677
.333
(.058)
(.126)
[65]
[15]

Difference of
Q1)-(2):
.344**

(.136)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.727
.745
(.079)
(.064)
[33]
[47]
.655
(.090)
[29]

.694
(.078)
[36]

Difference of
(1)--(2):
-.017
(.101)

-.039
(.118)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.714
.774
(.065)
(.076)
[49]
[31]
.625
(.078)
[401

.760
(.087)
[25]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.060
(.102)

-.135
(.120)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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(cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
F Justice Kennedy
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.672
.400
(.058)
(.131)
[67]
[15]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.272**
(.137)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.857
.723
(.060)
(.066)
[35]
[47]
.774
(.076)
[31]

.583
(.083)
[36]

Difference of
(1)-42):
.134
(.092)

.191*
(.114)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.784
.774
(.058)
(.076)
[51]
[31]
.667
(.074)
[42]

.680
(.095)
[25]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.010
(.095)

-.013
(.120)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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(cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
G. Justice Rehnquist
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
No
Yes
(2)
(1)
.462
.638
(.144)
(.058)
[13]
[69]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.176
(.148)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Republican
Democratic
(2)
(1)
.787
.800
(.069)
(.060)
[351
[471
.516
(.091)
[31]

.737
(.072)
[38]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.013
(.092)

-.221*
(.115)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate

When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Not Liberal
Liberal
(1)
(2)
.839
.765
(.067)
(.060)
[31]
[51]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.074
(.093)

.558

.769

-.211*

(.077)

(.084)

(.118)

[43]

[261

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
H. Justice Scalia
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.522
.467
(.061)
(.133)
[691
[15]

Difference of
(1)4-2):
.055
(.144)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.800
.837
(.069)
(.053)
[49]
[35]
.419
(.090)
[31]

.605
(.080)
[38]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.037
(.)

-.186
(.121)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.808
.844
(.055)
(.065)
[32]
[52]
.419
(.076)
[43]

.692
(.092)
[26]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.036
(.087)

-.273**
(.121)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (cont.)

Voting Rates of Individual Supreme Court Justices
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
I. Justice Thomas
I. Overall
Type of Vote
Voted to Validate

Court Applied Chevron?
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
.536
.462
(.067)
(.144)
[56]
[13]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.074
(.156)

II. By Party of Current President and Chevron Status
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.771
.676
(.072)
(.081)
[34]
[35]
.484
(.091)
[31]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.095
(.109)

.600
(.100)
[25]

-.116
(.143)

III. By Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Type of Vote
(A) Voted to Apply
Chevron

(B) Voted to Validate
When the Court
Applied Chevron

Ideological Content of Agency Decision
Liberal
Not Liberal
(1)
(2)
.689
.792
(.070)
(.085)
[45]
[24]
.378
(.081)
[37]

.842
(.086)
[19]

Difference of
(1)-(2):
-.103
(.114)

-.464**
(.129)

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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APPENDIX TABLE

2

Liberal Voting Rates of Supreme Court Justices:
by Groups of Justices, by Party of Current President,
and by Chevron Status

(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses,
and Number of Observations in Brackets)
I. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.730
.606
(.042)
(.047)
[115]
[109]

Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

(B) Court Did Not

Difference of
(1)-(2):
.125**
(.063)

.786

.886

-.100

Apply Chevron

(.114)
[14]

(.055)
[35]

(.112)

Difference of (A)-(B):

-.055
(.126)

-.280"*
(.089)

--

II. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor

Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.567
.458
(.065)
(.059)

Difference of
(l)-(2):
.108
(.088)

[60]

[72]

(B) Court Did Not
Apply Chevron

.375
(.183)
[8]

.636
(.105)
[22]

-.261
(.206)

Difference of (A)-(B):

.192
(.189)

-.178
(.122)

--

III. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
Type of Analysis
(A) Court Applied
Chevron

(B) Court Did Not
Apply Chevron

Difference of (A)-(B):

Party of Current President
Democratic
Republican
(1)
(2)
.387
.347
(.051)
(.048)
[93]
[101]
.167
(.112)
[12]

.414
(.093)
[29]

Difference of
(l)-(2):
.041
(.070)

-.247
(.162)

.220
-.067
-(.147)
(.102)
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, and ** denotes difference significant at
5 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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